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water Policy Decision-Making and
Jmplementation in the Johnson Administration*
J-iENRY B. S1RGO

McNeese State University
•Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science
Association, The Shamrock Hilton, Houston, March 16-19, 1983.
The relationship between policy development and actual implementation is a topic of continuing concern to political scientists. Accordingly, this
paper focuses on mutual-role taking 1 and speculative augmentation' by
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall in his quest to build political support
for a policy designed to prevent further deterioration of the quality of the
nation's water.
Murray Edelman argues that legislatures act primarily within the realm
of symbolism. 3 His classic example is antitrust legislation w'1ich reassures
the public that the economy is competitive while leaving economic concentration comfortably intact.• Water pollution legislation similarly has great
symbolic appeal.
Legislation to clean up the nation's waters is a "motherhood" consensus issue, particularly for the Democratic party. 5 The Water Quality Act of
1965which increased federal funds for sewage treatment plants and charged
the states with setting and implementing water quality standards passed
Congress unanimously.
It was clearly going to be easy to pass a clean water bill in the 89th Congress with its swollen Democratic majorities and Lyndon Johnson in the
White House. President Eisenhower had vetoed similar water pollution
legislation in 1960 which had easily passed both Democratic-controlled
chambers. 6 Findings by Riley Dunlap reveal Democrats to be significantly
more supportive than Republicans of environmental proposals at both the
legislative and congressional levels. 1 Furthermore, 860Jo of the American
publicin a 1965 Gallup poll supported the idea of a strong clean water program.'
Udall's two big concerns were to see that legislation which passed could
be implemented effectively and to nurture in-depth political support for environmentalism among the public, state and local authorities and federal
administrators.' Despite the favorable auguries of Democratic control and
public support, there was cause for concern.
John Kennedy's main issue concerning water in the 1960 presidential
campaign was that the Eisenhower administration did not build enough
dams. True, Kennedy did come to support water pollution legislation; and
Johnson, with visions of conservationist Franklin Roosevelt in his mind,
did so even more enthusiastically. 10 Obviously, presidential support could
wax and just as easily wane. Udall also perceived public support as being
superficial. There is evidence to suggest that there is misperception concerning support for environmental measures even among self-styled "environmentalists." Stephen Cotgrove found environmental concern to be
widespread and only modestly related to demographic variables such as income, education, and occupational status in Great Britain, Germany,
Australia, and the United States. 11 Lester Milbrath in 1976 surveyed the
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views of leaders " . . . representative of those who were most likely to Participate in the development of the water quality plan ... " for the Niagar
Frontier, a two-county region in New York . 12 Sixty-two percent of tha
public believed that cleaning up the water would create more jobs and on)e
10 or 11 percent maintained that it would reduce the num ber of jobs 1~
Among two subgroups of leaders, elected officials and enviro nrnentalisis
all of whom believed that clean water and jobs were compati ble, majoritie~
believed that the public felt that there had to be a choice between jobs and
clean water. 14 The putlook of the environmentalists is striki ngly similar to
views expressed by Udall. 15
In order for protection of the environment in general and clean-up of
the nation's waters in particular to take place, Udall argued that the public
had to be educated. Moreover, the Interior Department was to play a
leading role in the development of an environmental conscio usness which
was quite distinctive from the conservation orientation of the Theodore and
Franklin Roosevelt eras. 16 It is interesting to note that Cotgrove's
Catastrophe <?rCornucopia has as its central theme that the " new" environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s differed radically from earlier environmental efforts. 11 Indeed, he sees conflict between those of the older
perspective who care about the environment and those of the newer perspective who perceive a fragile spaceship earth that should ret urn to a preindustrial past. At any rate, he does suggest that environ mental consciousness has changed, at least among a significant portion of the populace
of the four nations of Great Britain, Germany, Australia an d the United
States . Heightened public concern about the environment was a goal of
Stewart Udall.
Udall was also concerned that water pollution policy have a strong
organizational basis.' 8 This comports nicely with the following passage by
Murray Edelman:
Establishment of a function at the highest hierar chical level is symbolically important only where there is
genuine doubt about its high valuation or political support . . .' 9
Despite Udall's support for action in the field of water pollut ion by the
federal government from the beginning of his tenure as Secretary of the Interior, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare act ually housed
the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration which was responsible
for implementation of the Water Quality Act of 1965, and H .E .W . had formal jurisdiction in the field of water pollution. 2° Indeed, ap parently in
recognition of this formal jurisdiction, no invitations to the signing of the
Water Quality Act of 1965 were extended to members of Int erior , while
H.E.W. was well represented. 21 But by 1966, largely because of Udall's
strong enthusiasm about water pollution clean-up efforts, the water pollution control functions vested by law in the Department of Healt h, Education, and Welfare were transferred to the Department of Interio r. 22
The following passage from a memorandum dated January 11, 1966,
to President Johnson from Lee C. White, Assistant Special Counse l, clearly
indicated that the transfer was perceived as having symbolic as well as
managerial significance:
The proposed reorganization would serve to concentrate
in a single Federal agency presently dispersed authorities
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for the management, development and conservation of
water resources. The emphasis would be shifted from
water pollution as primarily a health problem to pollution control as an integral element in the general
management of our water resources. 23
It was also seen as advantageously providing for the consolidation of
research programs and programs concerned with water quality standards. 2 •
The memorandum noted:
... Interior's data acquisition network is required to
meet the water quality measurement requirements of all
Federal agencies and provide water quality measurements common to the needs of two or more agencies ...
Transfer of abatement enforcement measures to Interior would bring within the jurisdiction of one department most of the programs relating to water quality
standards. 25
Disadvantages were cited by White as well.
White noted that there may be a conflict of interest between water
pollution control and natural resources projects. For instance, Interior has
a developmental interest in mining operations which constitute a serious
source of water pollution. 26 He cited problems concerning congressional
committee relations involving water pollution control and administration of
water pollution programs in states and communities. Interior programs
were generally referred to ". . . congressional committees dominated by
western members, whereas pollution problems stem from industrial and
municipal sources in the urban East. ... " 21 Also, H.E. W. has considerable
expf;!rienceworking through state and local agencies; whereas, Interior did
not have such expertise. 28
Stewart Udall saw these problems as having the kernels of excellent
political opportunities for the Department of Interior and its mission of
raising environmental consciousness. Interior is perceived as being a
~-estern and a rural department. The former is most visibly symbolized by
the fact that virtually every Secretary of the Interior has been from the West.
Byshifting responsibility for water pollution to Interior, Udall hoped to nationalize the concerns and the constituency of Interior, since Eastern states
particularly urban ones, clearly have a stake in water pollution policy. 29 It
should be added that he thought that because of its arid nature the ecology
of the West was highly fragile and that current levels of water quality there
had to be maintained. 30 This change would augment other moves to build
up programmatic responsibilities in the East such as the launching in 1961 of
the National Seashore Preservation Program. Nantuckett in President Kennedy's
home state of Massachusetts was the first area designated a national
seashore. The Padre Islands in then Vice-President Johnson's home state of
Texas were the second such designated site. 3 ' Moreover, Udall saw a splendid opportunity for Interior to build a base in state and local agencies, particularly urban ones, through the necessity of having to develop expertise
and administrative mechanisms to administer grant-in-aid funds for the
construction of sewage treatment plants. He maintained that this would set
the stage for increasing the concern of citizens with the urban environment
and the quality of life in the city, where most Americans spent most of their
lives.3 2
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Opposition to the transfer of functions from H.E.W. to Interior was
voiced by Charles L. Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. He 0
posed it because he believed that Secretary John Gardner of the Departme~;
of Health, Education and Welfare was more competent than Udall 11
Schultze was keenly interested in experimenting with effluent fees to cu~b
air and water pollution. Indeed, in 1977, he published The Public Use of th
Private Interest which dealt with the topic. i< Aside from the question 0 ~
competency, Schultze's chief argument involved the relationship of sym.
bolism to enforcement. The following is a passage from a memora ndum to
President Johnson:
As a practical matter, bringing enforcement actions in
the name of public health is much more likely to produce results than using the natural resource or recreation rationale. Moving the program to Interior seriously
weakens its ties to a public health orientation. 35
Symbolism was prominent in the reasoning of both Charles Schultze and
Stewart Udall, and both individuals had doubts about adequate support for
the realization of environmental clean-up in general and water pollution
control in particular. The chief distinction seems to be that Schultze was
primarily concerned about achieving relatively specific goals, and that Udall
additionally wished and believed that he could impart an environmental
ideology or consciousness. Both men engaged in mutual-ro le taking and
were cognizant that while virtually everyone may harbor a primeval need to
favor clean water, individuals such as governors concerned abo ut industrial
growth and their own electability may be a lot less enthusiastic about the
means to achieving that lofty end.
Senator Edmund Muskie, chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works and of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, worked closely with the administration
in the passage of the Water Quality Act of 1965.36 During his governship of
Maine, he ". . . had initiated a state program to upgrade the quality of
water in Maine streams-an action propelled in part by the dependence of
the Maine lobster industry on the purity of coastal waters. " 17 He supported
the idea of eventually transferring the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration to Interior, but argued that water quality policy had to evolve
further for such a move to be organizationally sound and politically feasible. He maintained that experience with implementation of the policy would
provide needed information for the resolution of organizational questions.
He noted:
The result (of the Water Quality Act) has been a flood
of new ideas . . . industrial incentives, regional water
and sewer systems, water transfers, effluent taxes and
expanded grants . . . Implicit is the question of
reorganization and rationalization of our water supply
and waste treatment programs. H
Muskie anticipated the "fixing" of organizational problems durin g the implementation stage of the Water Quality Act. According to Eugene Bardach,
such a view may be wise since '' ... good policy development is learning by
doing." 19
Far more significantly, he argued that such a transfer within six months
of passage of the Water Quality Act would create political pro blems for
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president Johnson. Muskie was himself engaged in delicate negotiations
with representatives of the wood pulp industry concerning implementation
of the act and feared that they, as well as other industrialists and state and
local officials, would find such a transfer confusing . Republicans could use
such a situation to add strength to charges of "Administration confusion"
which were already being successfully leveled against · the Poverty
program .•0
Despite opposition from Schultze and Muskie, Udall's wishes prevailed
and the Department of Interior assumed responsibility for the program on
May 10, 1966." The transfer comports will with James Davis' criteria concerning the likelihood of reorganization proposals being accepted. 42 He sees
presidential support and intensity of feeling as constituting crucial factors.
Udall, who served for eight years as Secretary of Interior, had President
Johnson's confidence and was able to achieve his support for the
proposal. 4 3 Udall was far more intense in his support for the proposal than
Schultze and Muskie were in their opposition to it.
On the day that responsibility was assumed, Secretary Udall issued the
Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality Standards. It was emphasized
that Interior " ... was not prepared to approve standards submitted by the
states unless they provided for upgrading waters now polluted and protecting waters already clean.,, .. The guidelines clearly embodied "speculative
augmentation" akin to that cited by Charles 0. Jones concerning passage
of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 in the following passage:
That the technology was not available for meeting the
1975 (auto emission) standards in the Senate bill was indisputable. In fact, Senator Muskie pointed out in the
floor debate that technology was rejected as a basis for
decisions in this area. "The deadline is based not, I
repeat, on economic and technological feasibility, but
on consideration of public health.,,.,
In other words, the authority granted in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970
was " ... based in large measure on 'speculation' that capabilities would
improve to meet demands of the law. " 46
In an oral history by Stewart Udall, he freely admitted that there were
technical difficulties in measuring water quality. 4 7 Criteria established for
quality in early efforts were " ... based largely on physical and chemical
conditions. " 48 Jerry I. Wilhm and Troy C. Dorris in a 1968 Bio Science article noted the following :
The attempt to establish criteria in terms of toxicity of
chemicals to aquatic organisms may exceed the capability
of adequate testing · due to the large number of toxic
compounds, the vast number of biotic species, the effects of interactions among compounds, and the wide
range of effects produced by variations in physical and
chemical conditions.
We propose the establishment of water quality
criteria by the evaluation of biological conditions existing in receiving streams. Effluents produce striking
changes in the structure of the benthic macroinvertebrate
community. A distinctive longitudinal series of populations can be identified in a polluted stream until water
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quality and biotic structure approach the normal situation .•9
It is worth emphasizing that the above was published nearly three ·yea
after the ~assa~e _of ~he Wa~er Q~ality Act of 1965_.So, there were clear~s
technological hm1tat1ons which hmdered the establishment of viable
quality criteria. But, concerned about the loss of political mome ntum th r
Department of Interior pressed hard for states to submit the best po s~ibl:
standards. 50
Interior initially promulgated some water quality standards which conflicted with its long range goals, but such criteria were perhaps necessary to
get the program off to a strong start. Concerning treatment for m unicipal
and industrial wastes, Interior required '' . . . that secondary treatment
(85% removal of biochemical oxygen demand-BOD)
would be the
minimum degree acceptable ... " 51 This blanket standard allow ed the
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration to avoid negotiating
quagmires with state officials and seemed "fair. " 52 But, such a standard
was questionable in terms of economic efficiency and led one group of
researchers to ask the following:
''Why go through the business of setting stream standards if they are not indeed being used as the basis for
developing treatment requirements?" 53
Such arbitrary standards which were " ... unrelated to water quality of
receiving bodies ... , " also hindered regional or river basin wat er quality
management 5•....:...
a long range goal of Secretary Udall. 55
Interior was conscious of the importance of the image which it projected during the initial stages of implementation of the Water Quality Act.
It feared being labeled "pro-industry" and maintained the followi ng:
A degradation of water quality in standards of even 1
part per million of oxygen is a 'license to pollute' and
may be interpreted as weakening, having a bad psychological effect on municipal and state government people
working for clean water, on the general public and
voters on bond issues. 56
This policy was of particular concern to Governor Tim M. Babcock of
Montana 57 and Governor Stan Hathaway of Wyoming both of whom maintained that their waters were pristine and wanted to induce ind ustries to
locate in their respective states. 58 Interior did not want to be perce ived as
caving in to pressure at the earliest stages of implementation, nor wish to
engage in litigation with the states at such a point in time. The stat es were
responsible for establishing their own standards. If these were not acceptable to the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, then the
Secretary of Interior would be impowered to draft standards for the state in
questions. It was believed that rejection of irlitial efforts at standard-se tting by
several states would instill fear among the remaining states and result in
"stronger, more viable standards." 59 State and local government of ficials
were not the only parties whose cooperation was vital for success ful implementation.
There was great concern about the reaction of industry. At the time of
the passage of the legislation, Senator Muskie had engaged in delicate
negotiations with the wood and pulp industry. 60 The seminal water pollution legislation which passed in 1924 dealt specifically with oil discharges
from ships. 61 The oil industry sought to be involved in the formulat ion of

wat/
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water pollution legislation in 1965 and with its implementation later.
Jn response to the section of President Johnson's State of the Union
message pertaining to air and water conservation, Frank N. Ikard of the
American Petroleum Institute wrote the following:
You have a pledge of full cooperation from the
American Petroleum Institute, and the industry it
serves, to help in any way we can to further effective,
well-founded air and water conservation programs.
To this end, we will be glad to provide scientists
and other experts to meet with those in your administration who will be working in this vital field and to share
with them the information and experience the petroleum
industry has acquired through years of research and
practical application of discoveries. 62
President Johnson invited a small group from the oil industry to meet with
him to provide input into pollution legislation. 63 A letter from Bill Moyers,
Special Assistant to the President, to Frank Ikard expressed marked enthusiasm about the prospect of oil industry scientists aiding air and water
conservation efforts. 6 ' The exchanges between the American Petroleum Institute and the White House are thought-provoking .
One can easily speculate about and ascribe motives to Frank Ikard's
letter of January 21, 1965. He could have been genuinely concerned about
the quality of pollution research, he could have recognized the "inevitability"
of the passage of some type of conservation legislation in 1965 and sought
to have as much influence as possible on its formulation and implementation. Moyer's response perhaps is indicative of a desire on the part of the
White House to "co-opt" the oil industry. A fascinating study could focus
on the role which oil industry scientists have _played in the implementation of
water pollution legislation. Indeed, the systematic study by political scientists of the role of industrial scientists in public policy areas would be highly
valuable. Clearly, values are involved in such endeavors. W. Henry Lambright
and Albert H. Teich in a discussion of the role of the scientist as policy advisor wrote the following:
Most of the time, the questions that policy-makers want
to pose to their science advisors are of the type
Weinberg has called "trans-science." They are questions that involve an amalgam of facts and values or
that require the application of seasoned judgment. They
are, are in a fundamental sense, beyond the power of
science to answer. Furthermore, they are usually questions about which expert scientists disagree, questions
such as those concerning the safety of civilian nuclear
reactors. 6 i
The oil industry continues to figure prominently in discussions of water
pollution.
Oil discoveries off of the California coast drew national attention in
1982 as is suggested in the following passage:
The potential size of the new discoveries near the
western end of the channel is so great that environmentalists say they fear irresistible federal and corporate
pressure to open offshore areas further up the coast
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(from the Santa Barbara channel) to oil drilling, particularly since California's
Democratic governor,
Edmund G . (Jerry) Brown Jr., an active opponent of
much offshore drilling, is about to be succeeded by
Republican George Deukmejian. 66
The above passage is also suggestive of the dynamic nature of federalisrn
which has been cited by Morton Grodzins. 67 During the Johnson administr~tion,_ Udall per~eived the role of !~eInt~rior Department as being
one of mducmg lethargic states and locahties to implement effective water
pollution control policies. In the above instance and others, we have Reagan
administration officals allegedly restraining what they perceive as
overzealous environmentally-oriented state officials. 61 Such developments
suggest the logic of what Paul Sabatier describes as "the strategy of environmental groups" in the following passage:
While supporting the expansion of the scope of the conflict to the Federal government, they have continued to
focus considerable attention on pollution control programs at the state and local level. In part, of course, this
is a recognition of the crucial role of these "lower"
levels of government in implementing Federal standards.
At the same time, they have pressed for more stringent
regulations by state and local authorities, thereby indicating an implicit awareness of what might be called
"the principle of beneficient overlap:" the more
governmental units involved concurrently in regulatory
activity, the greater the probability that one of them will
adopt and aggressively enforce stringent regulations. 69
The Water Quality Act of 1965 had a modest effect on the quality of
America's waters. 1 0 It was supplemented by the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 (PL 92-500) which established " . .. zero
discharge standards for 1985. " 11 Hence, states no longer will be responsible
for developing water quality standards. But, against the context of federal
pollution enforcement budget cuts, the standards are likely to be realized or
approached only if there is vigorous action by state and local officials. 12
There may well be such action. The traditional pre-eminence of states and
localities as environmental managers, albeit more concerned ones, may be
re-established. 73 They may conceivably lobby for more rather than less action by the national government.
Such developments to the extent that, and if, they occur will in a sense
be ironic. But, such developments would underscore the importance of symbolism in politics and suggest that Udall was correct to see the most important mission of the Department of Interior as being educational.
Of course, it is open to question how much effect, if any, the Department of Interior's efforts in the 1960s had on raising environmental consciousness among state officials and the general public. This should be the
subject of empirical research.
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